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Communicating with Juriest
FRED H. CATE*
NEWTON N. MINoW*"
INTRODUCTION
Communications failures plague the central component of the United States
judicial system: the jury Prior to jury selection, the press-vigorously
exercising its First Amendment rights-often saturates the public with news
and opinions about every facet of a case involving issues, events, or people
of public interest. Because of this communication outside the courtroom,
potential jurors may arrive at the courthouse on the first day of the trial with
extensive knowledge about the victim, the crime, and the defendant, including
possibly inaccurate or highly influential information that, for evidentiary or
strategic purposes, may never be introduced in court. As a result, courts face
great difficulty in guaranteeing criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment right
to be tried by "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed."'
Unfortunately, the forces that inhibit jury impartiality are not limited to
outside the courtroom. Once empaneled, jurors routinely report not under-
standing judges' instructions or even the basic facts of a complex case, while
judges and attorneys feel limited by precedent and the dictates of reviewing
courts to depart from traditional, even though ineffective, methods of
communicating with juries. "[A] jury trial is very often much like watching
a foreign movie without subtitles," observes Wall Street Journal legal editor
Steven Adler. "If there's a lot of action, you have a general idea what's going
on. If there isn't a lot of action, you're in trouble."2
t © Copyright 1993 by Fred H. Cate and Newton N. Minow. All rights reserved.
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1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. Communicating with Juries, Panel One: Judge-Jury Communications: Improving Communica-
tions and Understanding Bias, The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND.
LJ. 1037, 1038 (1993) [hereinafter Panel One] (statement of Steven Adler).
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The failure of the United States judicial system to remedy the communica-
tions gap between the jury and other trial participants (the judge, attorneys,
and witnesses) is as damaging to that jury's ability to do justice as the failure
to seat an impartial, representative jury in the first place.
Communications outside and inside the American courtroom have been the
subjects of two forums sponsored by The Annenberg Washington Program in
Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University The Program acts
as a bridge between policymakers, academics, practitioners, the press, and the
public on important policy issues involving communications. In its first jury
forum-Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search
for Justice?-the Program invited judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
social scientists, and members of the press to consider the importance of
communications outside the courtroom, particularly the impact of the press on
jury selection in notorious trials and of the frequent practice of excusing
media-literate citizens from jury service. The proceedings of that forum,
together with related articles by forum participants, were published in a
special issue of The American University Law Review in 1991.3
In May, 1992, the Program sponsored a second jury forum-Communicating
with Juries-focusing specifically on communications within the courtroom.
The forum examined problems with judge-jury and attorney-jury communica-
tions, current methods for improving those communications (for example,
written instructions, simplified instructions, and instructions given before and
after the cases are presented), and what social science and practice indicate
aboutv the effectiveness of each. The second Annenberg jury forum also
addressed technological innovations for improving judge-jury communications
(for example, computer graphics, video copies of instructions, and video
excerpts from testimony). This issue of the Indiana Law Journal contains the
proceedings from the Communicating with Juries forum, as well as related
articles and commentaries by distinguished judges, social scientists, academ-
ics, and attorneys.4
3. Symposium Issue on the Selection and Function of the Modern Jury, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 541
(1991).
4. The Annenberg Washington Program is grateful to each of the participants in its jury forums,
many of whom are also contributors to this special edition. They have shared generously of their time,
experience, and scholarship to address the vexing communications issues confronting the modem
courtroom. The Program especially acknowledges the contributions of the forum convener, Peter David
Blanck, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law and a Senior Fellow of The
Annenberg Washington Program. Finally, the Program thanks the editors and staff of the Indiana Law
Journal, and particularly Editor-m-Chief Patrick S. Cross and Executive Articles Editor Kathenne B.
Lieber, whose energy and diligent efforts have made this unique volume possible.
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I. COMMUNICATIONS OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM
In 1871 Mark Twain described the system by which jurors are selected as
putting "a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance,
stupidity, and perjury "' Twain wrote that when juries were first used,
news could not travel fast, and hence [the king] could easily find a jury of
honest, intelligent men who had not heard of the case they were called to
try, but in our day of telegraph and newspapers his plan compels us to
swear in juries composed of fools and rascals, because the system rigidly
excludes honest men and men of brains.6
Twain's concern was that judges were responding to the expansion of the
media-in 1871, telegraph and newspapers-and news reports about people
and events that later were the subject of a trial by banning informed citizens
from juries. More than a century later, The Daily Telegraph (London) wrote
about jury selection in U.S. courts for another trial, that of Lt. Colonel Oliver
North: "[I]gnorance is the path to enlightenment. The slightest taint of
interest in the world beyond home and work is enough to win dismissal."'
The impact on trials of communications outside the courtroom demand more
attention today than ever before. Satellites, mobile equipment, broadcast and
cable television, and other new technologies, combined with an insatiable
public curiosity, have led to an explosion in news coverage and dramatic
reenactments of criminal activities. Mass media proliferates in American life
in ways never even dreamed of by Twain. It is impossible for any responsible
citizen to be unaware of alleged major crimes in the local community Even
on the national level, Oliver North, Marion Barry, Joseph Hazelwood, Manuel
Noriega, William Kennedy Smith, and Mike Tyson are household names.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in a 1961 concurrence that "[n]ot a Term
passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in
States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury
trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts "8
But the frequency of such claims-driven by technological expansion, greater
institutional prerogative on the part of the media, and heightened public
expectations-has led to an explosion of claims by criminal defendants and
their counsel of juries biased by press reports. The public is inundated with
5. MARK TwAIN, ROUGHING IT 257 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1980) (1871).
6. Id. at 256.
7. Ian Brodie, Wanted: 12 GoodMen and True, with Bad Memories, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Feb. 8, 1989, at 19.
8. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11031993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
courthouse steps claims by defense lawyers that "my client can't get a fair
trial because of pretrial publicity "
Despite the potential threat of news coverage about the issues, events, or
people involved in a notorious trial, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that judges may not prohibit the press from publishing truthful, lawfully
obtained information relating to the trial.' ° Judges may seek to limit the
release of information to the press, particularly by prosecutors, police, and
court officers," but the First Amendment provides an extraordinarily high
obstacle to restrictions on the press itself. Moreover, it is often impossible for
a judge to control the publication of prejudicial information because
increasingly the most dramatic revelations in the press occur at the time of the
crime itself, long before there is a trial, much less a judge selected to oversee
the trial. Photographs of the victim or of the defendant being led away in
handcuffs by police, details about the crime, and reports of community
outrage are highly inflammatory, even though they first appear well in
advance of any trial.
As a result, in cases where control of the media is impossible, as well as in
the vast majority of other cases where control of the media is not constitution-
ally permitted, the judicial system must focus its attention on identifying and
either remedying or avoiding, rather than preventing, partiality among
potential jurors. Courts are not without a variety of options, including change
of venue, continuance, jury instructions, and voir dire. Judges rely on these
techniques to help fulfill their constitutional duty to impanel impartial juries.
Yet many social scientists participating in the first Annenberg jury forum
questioned the effectiveness of these techniques, particularly in light of the
time and money they consume. Other critics charge that the use of these
methods impinges on important rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to
be tried before a jury chosen from "the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed."' 2
Moreover, these measures, especially voir dire, frequently focus the court's
attention on the mere fact of exposure to press reports, rather than on the
9. During the 1980s, national newspapers and wire services alone reported over 3,100 such claims.
This figure is based on searches in the NEXIS newspaper and wire service databases and may
confidently be assumed to underestimate the actual number of reports, because not all national newspa-
pers and services were covered by these databases during the early 1980s. Moreover, it is reasonable
to assume that far more claims would be reported by regional and local press-most of which are not
included in these databases-because of the greater number of regional and local papers and the greater
number of trials that are highly publicized only in the local or regional press.
10. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court in and for Oklahoma County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976).
I1. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1976).
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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existence and degree of any bias or prejudice that may have been engendered
by such exposure. As a result, some courts mistake "unaware" for "impartial,"
and so search unnecessarily for jurors who know nothing about the case to be
heard. This process, particularly in notorious cases, is often time-consuming
and expensive. If the defendant is unusually well-known, it may be impossible
to impanel a jury wholly ignorant of his or her activities. Such a quest
excludes qualified citizens from the jury, resulting in panels composed of
citizens who are less representative of their surrounding community At
minimum, the search for "unaware' jurors diverts the court's attention from
its constitutional obligation to seat an "impartial" jury
In the special issue of The American University Law Review containing the
proceedings from the first Annenberg jury forum, we argued that courts need
neither ignore the impact of media coverage on the selection of an impartial
jury, nor become hopelessly enmeshed in examining the amount and type of
media coverage through extended and far-reaching voir dire. The language of
the Sixth Amendment, the dictates of the Supreme Court, and the realities of
modem society require that courts impanel juries that are impartial, but not
without knowledge and opinions." In the words of the Supreme Court: "It
is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression
or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."
1 4
II. COMMUNICATIONS INSIDE THE COURTROOM
A. The Breadth of the Problem
1. Inadequate Communications
The impact of communications on the judicial system is not limited to
communications outside the courtroom and to the influence of media on jury
selection. Communications failures often occur within the modem courtroom.
According to the American Bar Association Litigation Section's recent study,
Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases,"5 the typical juror in complex federal
cases "is bored and confused. What's more, he misunderstands key legal
concepts and struggles to reach a just decision. And, the juror's task is made
13. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REv. 631, 637 (1991).
14. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
15. SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, AM. BAR ASS'N, JURY COMPREHENSION IN
COMPLEX CASES (1990).
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more difficult by the way lawyers and judges present evidence and explain
legal concepts.""
Profess'or Robert F Forston, reporting the results of a wide variety of jury
comprehension studies in the mid-1970s, concluded that "a condition of
pervasive confusion does in fact exist among jurors in the present jury
system" and that this pervasive confusion "is largely a result of poor
communication."'
17
Jurors often improperly find the facts because the concept of legal evidence
is seldom adequately communicated to them. They often improperly apply
the law because they are unable to comprehend the jury instructions. They
often fail to rationally consider legal arguments because they have
difficulty understanding legal jargon. Also, time is often wasted in the
deliberation room because the jury does not fully understand its func-
tion.'8
Forston's analysis identifies four of the major impediments to effective
communications with juries: (1) confusion over the concept of legal evidence;
(2) unclear and ill-timed jury instructions; (3) the use of excessive and
repetitive legal jargon; and (4) a lack of consensus over the function of the
modern jury To these might be added: (5) the complexity inherent in much
of the law that jurors are required to apply; and (6) the ill-conceived,
outdated, and counterproductive nature of many of the rules that govern the
trial process (for example, prohibitions on jurors taking notes and discussing
the case with each other). For example, jurors routinely report not understand-
ing what is happening during a trial and the law that they are instructed to
apply "[Y]ou have this intractable problem," according to Steven Adler, "of
trying to translate what is often very complex law and very legalistic language
for an audience that is in no way equipped to deal with it."' 9
This was not always the case. Prior to the judicial "reforms" of the late
nineteenth century, judges "told the jury about the law in frank, natural
language. But," writes noted legal historian Lawrence Friedman, "this practice
died out-or was driven out."2 Instead,
[t]he instructions became solemn written documents, drafted by the
lawyers. Each side drew up statements of law; the judge merely picked out
those that were (in his judgment) legally "correct." In any event, the
instructions were technical, legalistic, utterly opaque. They were almost
16. Paul Marcotte, The Verdict Is ., A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 32.
17. Robert F Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601,
606.
18. Id.
19. Panel One, supra note 2, at 1039 (statement of Steven Adler).
20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 399 (2d ed. 1985).
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useless as a way to communicate with juries; the medium conveyed no
message.2'
This is still true today Washington, D.C., defense attorney Jamie S.
Gorelick has noted: "the worst part [of courtroom communications] is the
instruction. The instructions are meaningless even to lawyers who are
following them and reading them and who presumably understand the law "22
Consider the following passage from the eighty-page instruction given to the
jury in a recent antitrust case in North Carolina between Liggett & Myers and
Brown & Williamson:
"The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reason-
able interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of supply and demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it." All of these factors must
be examined in determining whether a well-defined submarket exists in a
broader market. However, the existence of a submarket or its lack of
existence does not require the presence or absence of all of the factors. The
submarket test is not merely whether one product can be substituted for the
use of another product, but whether products may be reasonably inter-
changed for the purposes for which they are produced.23
Steven Adler reported at the second Annenberg jury forum that the "typical"
juror to whom this instruction was given was a textile worker with a high
school education, people who found Greensboro, North Carolina, to be "a very
difficult city to get around because they were mostly from the surrounding
countryside." One of the jurors, according to Adler, had never before used a
parking meter. But "he could have been a Ph.D. and it would not have
mattered." "I had to read [the instruction] seven or eight times to even have
the vaguest sense of what it meant."'24
These concerns echoed those expressed at the first Annenberg jury forum
by former United States Attorney Joseph E. diGenova: "instructions are
basically useless, particularly in complex cases where judges will not give
jurors copies of instructions, so that the jurors, after hearing half a day of
instructions,, are supposed to remember what the law is, as well as the facts,
when the lawyers themselves will, in most cases, find the instructions
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22. Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search for Justice?, Panel One:
What Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for
Impartiality, The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, May 11, 1990, 40 AM. U. L. RFV. 547,
556 (1990) [hereinafter Empirical Research] (statement of Jamle S. Gorelick).
23. Jury Instruction, Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344
(M.D.N.C. 1990) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,325 (1962)), aff'd, 964 F.2d
335 (4th Cir. 1992).
24. Panel One, supra note 2, at 1038 (statement of Steven Adler).
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incomprehensible."2 This conclusion is also supported by a number of
studies, including two experiments by Amiram Elwork, Bruce Sales, and
James Alfini:
If a jury is to successfully apply the law to a case, the judge's
instructions must be written in language that is understandable to the
average juror and they must be delivered at times when they can be most
effective. There is little doubt that present procedures do not meet these
criteria. Unless the situation is corrected, juries will continue to reach
decisions arbitrarily, and countless litigants will be denied their constitu-
tional right to a fair trial. 6
Not only are the instructions often opaque to jurors, trials themselves are
often conducted in a language that is wholly and needlessly foreign to the
jury According to Adler, who has been observing trials and talking with
jurors for a forthcoming book on juries, jurors often have difficulty with
words such as "ambiguously," "representation," "conversion," "tacitly,"
"nucleus," "executing," "artifice," and "immaterial"; words that lawyers are
comfortable with and use regularly during the trial and in jury instructions.
"Sometimes [jurors] ask for dictionaries, and usually the judge does not
permit them to have a dictionary They are simply seeking a definition of the
word that they can understand so they can make use of it."27
2. Prejudicial Communications
Of course, some communications problems arise precisely because jurors do
understand certain courtroom communications all too well. Judges may engage
in prejudicial communications regarding the credibility of a witness or the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Law professor Peter Blanck, convener of
Communicating with Juries, reports:
In many cases from around the country, a trial judge's biased
communication directed toward the jury has constituted, by itself, a
violation of defendants' due process rights in the criminal trial, resulting
25. Empirical Research, supra note 22, at 565 (statement of Joseph E. diGenova). See generally
J. Alexander Tanford, The Law & Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REv. 71 (1990).
26. Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 163, 178 (1977); see also Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal
Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306,
1359 (1979) ("The results of this study-in conjunction with the results of other studies of jury
instruction comprehension-underscore the fact that jury instructions are not written for their major
intended audience. The inability ofjurors to comprehend the charge adequately has obvious implications
concerning the soundness of the jury system: if many jurors do not properly understand the laws that
they are required to use in reaching their verdicts, it is possible that many verdicts are reached either
without regard to the law or by using improper law.").
27. Panel One, supra note 2, at 1039 (statement of Steven Adler).
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in the reversal of the conviction. In one often cited case, for example, a
Missouri judge hearing the defendant's brother testify that the defendant
was at home when the alleged burglary occurred, placed his hands to the
side of his head, shook his head negatively, leaned back, and swivelled his
chair 180 degrees from the jury, without uttering a word. Needless to say,
that jury received a not-so-subtle message from that judge.2"
According to Harvard social psychology professor Robert Rosenthal, one
study has shown that if a judge believed a particular defendant to be guilty,
sixty-four percent of the jurors returned a verdict of guilty. If the judge
believed the defendant to be innocent, however, only forty-nine percent of the
jurors returned a guilty verdict.29 "[T]here was a fifteen percent difference
(between sixty-four percent and forty-nine percent) that was, in a sense, in the
mind and expectation of the judge. 30
B. Efforts at Solutions
Judges are not without measures to better involve jurors in the trial process
and facilitate their understanding. Arizona Superior Court Judge B. Michael
Dann believes that little has actually changed in the way trials are conducted
in the United States. But he notes that social scientists have recommend-
ed-and some trial judges are experimenting with--"some innovative
techniques to make the trial more of a learning experience for jurors. By
introducing two-way interactive communication into the courtroom, a principle
that underlies effective teaching in the classroom, jurors will become more
actively involved in the process."3
For example, Judge Dann and other participants suggested the following
improvements: giving case-specific juror orientation; making opening
statements before jury selection; giving preliminary jury instructions;
providing juror notebooks (containing copies of opening statements,
instructions, and other key documents); permitting jurors to take notes;
maintaining better document control (so that attorneys and judges can indicate
which documents they think are important and facilitate the easy retreival of
the documents); permitting jurors to question witnesses; permitting interim
28. Communicating with Juries. Welcoming Remarks and Statement of the Issues, The Annenberg
Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND. L.L 1033, 1035 (1993) (footnotes omitted)
(statement of Peter D. Blanck).
29. Panel One, supra note 2, at 1043 (statement of Robert Rosenthal).
30. Id.
31. Communicating with Juries, Panel Two: InnovationsforlImproving Courtroom Communications
and Views from Appellate Courts, The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68
IND. LJ. 1061, 1062 (1993) [hereinafter Panel Two] (statement of Judge B. Michael Dann); see also
B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights" Creating Educated and Democratic
Juries, 68 IND. L.L 1229 (1993).
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summaries by attorneys; simplifying the content and style of instructions;
changing the timing of instructions (for example, allowing the judge to give
the instructions before closing arguments); giving the jurors written copies of
the instructions; asking the jurors before they retire whether they have any
questions; allowing jurors, within limits and in a structured way, to talk to
each other about the evidence as it comes in, so long as they do not
prematurely make up their minds about the ultimate issues; and responding
meaningfully to questions submitted by the jury during deliberations.32
Communication, according to Judge Dann, can be the key to comprehension
within the jury box itself. "Jurors have a natural desire to talk to someone
about the case as it is unfolding in front of them. There is a suggestion, which
needs to be documented through studies, that comprehension will improve if
they can talk to each other during the trial. 3 The traditional rule, however,
forbids discussions by jurors; judges constantly remind them throughout the
trial at every break and before each evening recess, "now don't talk to each
other or anyone else until you begin your deliberations." This is unnatural and
counterproductive.
The same principle should apply, according to Judge Dann, when the jury
is at an impasse:
We are familiar with the contents of the first note we receive from a jury
when they do not think they can reach a verdict in the case. Sometimes
they ask for help and sometimes they do not. One of the problems is that
they do not even know that they can ask for help. But how do we respond
to those first notes? Typically we bring the jury in and read them this
ritual: "Hold to your conviction but share, be willing to listen, change your
position if you are convinced but only if you are convinced. It is important
that you reach a verdict, but I do not mean to force a verdict. Go back and
deliberate."
My suggestion is that we should have an interactive communication
process at that point. We should instruct the jurors, in writing, orally, or
both, that if they are having a problem reaching a verdict, they should
write down the issues dividing them, which could be further addressed by
the judge or the lawyers.34
Why are these and other sensible suggestions not at least tried? The answer,
from Judge Dann's perspective, may lie in legal education, "the common
denominator shared by lawyers and judges."35
Their legal education inhibits them, I believe, from being more open-
minded to the findings of social scientists. It ties them to the past, to the
32. Panel Two, supra note 3 1, at 1064 (statement of Judge B. Michael Dann).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1064-65.
35. Id. at 1062.
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model of the jury we inherited from England, and invests them in the
current adversarial model for trial.
Lawyers and judges are very hesitant to modify that current
model-the game theory that prevails at many trials. They are unwilling to
modify it substantially to take into account the needs of jurors. So much
of what we have talked about this morning, and maybe for the rest of the
day, will have some implications for legal education as well. Legal
education does sharpen the mind, no question about it, but it does so by
narrowing the mind in many respects.
36
In addition, judges have expressed reluctance to break from past practice for
fear of being reversed. At the first Annenberg jury forum, an audience
member asked Judge Stanley Sporkin of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, "Judge Sporkin, you could let jurors take notes, and
you could let jurors ask questions, and you could do all these things. You
have tremendous freedom as a federal judge to do those things. Why does it
not happen more often? '37 Judge Sporkm responded, "I am a coward. . I
guess I could do it, but the system says, do not do it. I think that, before I
become a pioneer, I would need a consensus of the judges to do it.""8
"Besides," Judge Sporkin added, pointing to Chief Judge Abner Mikva of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, "Ab would
overturn me."'39 This was echoed at the second forum by law professor
Michael Saks: "[J]udges are really speaking to the appellate court, not to the
jurors. You have at least two audiences, and the audience that is taken more
seriously is the appellate court. You want to keep them happy You want to
make sure the appellate court likes the jury charges."4
Judicial reluctance to depart with pattern instructions may also reflect a
recognition that jury instructions have a far wider, and perhaps more
important, audience than the jury or even the appellate court. According to
Professor Saks:
My speculation is that the real audience for instructions from the bench is
the entire legal community. It is a chance to restate the instructions for the
legal community- not just the appellate courts, but the lawyers and the
other judges who read them. It is not usually the jurors who will be reading
36. Id.
37. Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Searchfor Justice?, Panel Two:
Current Judical Practice, Legal Issues, and Existing Remedies, The Annenberg Washington Program
Conference, May 11, 1990, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 573, 594 (1990) [hereinafter Current Judicial Practice]
(statement of unidentified audience member).
38. Id. (statement of Judge Stanley Sporkm).
39. Communicating with Juries, Panel Three: Demonstration and Discussion of Technological
Advances in the Courtroom, The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND.
L.J 1081, 1081 (1993) [hereinafter Panel Three] (statement of Fred H. Cate) (quoting Judge Stanley
Sporkin).
40. Panel Two, supra note 31, at 1074 (footnote omitted) (statement of Michael Saks).
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these instructions, it will be lawyers and trial judges in other cases. So the
real, important audience for the law is the legal community. They are the
ones who have to get it right.4
According to Judge Patricia McGowan Wald of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the American Bar Association is
currently revising its model criminal justice standards. Judge Wald, who sits
on the committee supervising the revision, reported that four innovations are
included in the draft revisions: (1) "that jurors be allowed to take notes and
to carry those notes into the jury room with them", (2) "that at the very
beginning-of the trial, first the judge should explain to the jurors all the rules
of the game, what is going to happen, and who can communicate with whom",
(3) "that the instructions should come before the closing argument", and (4)
"that the jurors should be allowed to take into the jury room, if they so desire,
not just a copy of the charges, indictment, and instructions, but any exhibits
or writings, unless there is something inherently dangerous about letting them
do that.
42
"That is glacial movement," concluded Judge Wald, "in the eyes of some
of the more interesting experiments that are coming along here, but I do think
it at least indicates that some of this information is getting out there to the
great unwashed. It is also an invitation for the social science researchers
doing some of the more interesting research to get some input before these
standards are finished."43
C. The Role of Communications Technology
Innovative communications technologies may enhance the understanding of
juries far more dramatically than merely simplifying written jury instructions
or allowing jurors to take notes. Computer and video technologies are
currently being used both for illustrative or explanatory purposes and for legal
research and document or case management.44 Examples of the illustrative
or explanatory use of communications advances include the use of computer
animation, interactive video, flat visual representations, and three-dimensional
models to explain complicated engineering or design concepts, to re-create the
scene of a crime or accident, to simulate the simultaneous movement of
numerous people or objects, to illustrate magnitude or quantity, to take the
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1072 (statement of Judge Patricia Wald).
43. Id. at 1073.
44. On the use of computer technology in the courtroom generally, see Diane Knox, Phoenix's
Courtroom of the Future, AM. LAW., May 1991, Supp., at 4; Roger Parloff, Now Showing in a
Courtroom Near You, AM. LAW., May 1990, Supp., at 4; Joseph F Sullivan, High-Tech Trials: Yellow
Pads Meet Laser Disks, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 14, 1992, at B5.
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jury to a location to which it would be impossible or inconvenient to travel
physically, and to allow the jury to witness events it could not otherwise
see.
45
Computers are also used for legal research and document or case manage-
ment, often increasing both efficiency and impact. LEXIS and WESTLAW,
for example, have dramatically increased the speed and efficiency (as well as
perhaps the cost) of legal research. These and other databases allow attorneys,
irrespective of location, instant access to a wide variety of resources. Expert
computer systems help attorneys create and structure arguments, make
decisions, organize documents, and manage complex cases. An attorney armed
with a laser disc can have instant access to a witness's deposition or to a
document entered into evidence.4 Prior statements can be indexed, cross-
referenced, and even played for the court and the jury in the deponent's own
voice. Similarly, attorneys practicing before courts using real-time video
transcription can instantly recall and replay for the jury a statement uttered
only moments earlier. Both the jury and reviewing courts can not only read
a witness's printed words, but also watch his or her demeanor, hear tone and
inflection, and see facial expressions, hand gestures, or other body language
that accompanied the statement.47
The impact of these technologies is obvious, as illustrated by a recent case
before Judge Stanley Sporkin, Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,4
in which the plaintiff employed a laser disc system to organize and present
more than 1,000 exhibits and depositions and trial testimony from seventy-
nine witnesses and nineteen expert witnesses. Defense counsel stood up to
make his closing argument and, in an effort to regain the momentum, told
45. See Frank L. Branson, Innovative Techniques in Demonstrative Evidence, in PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION 85 (Am. Law Inst. & Am. Bar Ass'n eds., 1989); Thomas Brown, Visual
Evidence: Animations Add a New Dimension, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1991, at 19; Michael E. Cobo, A
Strategic Approach to Demonstrative Exhibits and Effective Jury Presentations, in ACCOUNTANTS
LIABILITY 1990: TRIAL STRATEGIES 359 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
395, 1990); Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation Litigation:
Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 839 (1990); Jersey M. Green, Demonstrative
Trial Technique: The Introduction of Illustrative Exhibits, 14 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 65 (1991); Mark
Hansen, Unfettered Filming, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 32; Robert Seltzer, Effective Communication:
Seeing Is Believing, in PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS 1988: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 597
(Practicing Law Inst. ed., 1988); Selwyn Raab, New York City Plans a TV Network to Link Jails and
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, § 1, at 33; C. Caverhill Schaefer et al., Computer Simulations in
Court, TRIAL, July 1987, at 69.
46. See Stuart S. Nagel, A Reference Guide on Computers and Legal Decision-Making, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 235 (1990); David T. Shannon & Forouzan Golsham, On the Automation of Legal
Reasoning, 28 JUiMEmRcs J. 305 (1988).
47. See Thomas J. Murray, Jr., Using Video in Litigation, in DEPOSITION TECHNIQUES IN
COMMERCIAL LIGATION 299 (PLI Litig. & Admi. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 328, 1987).
48. 720 F. Supp. 194 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
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Judge Sporkin he was going to present his argument in "the old-fashioned
way, with paper and voice." Judge Sporkin retorted, "Don't knock the new
way I am telling you it is sensational. I must tell you I think that's going to
be the way of the future. It is very impressive.
' 4 9
The reason is simple, as Theodore D. Ciccone, President of Litigation
Communications, Inc., explains:
The majority of our learning comes to us through our sight. From
childhood, we first begin observing our parents and peers as models of
behavior. The enormous amounts of information presented in our education
process are absorbed primarily through sight. Our reasoning and imagina-
tion are fueled by information gathered with our sense of sight.
Is it any wonder that today visual aids are considered to be the most
effective way of communicating abstract or complex technical data? Visual
input is a vital portion of the human ability to process and remember facts.
Research has shown that the use of visual aids with an oral presentation
can aid comprehension, minimize misunderstanding, and increase retention
level by as much as sixty-five percent.
[A] witness's oral testimony can be absolutely boring and by this
time a juror has stopped paying full attention. It should come as no surprise
that as much as ninety percent of verbal testimony is misunderstood or
forgotten completely Visual aids allow you to logically convey your
client's story to the jury. You may hone in on pertinent facts relative to
your case in ways that will dramatically increase understanding and
retention during deliberation-days, weeks, or months later.5"
Despite the impact of these visual technologies, they are still the exception
rather than the rule in most American courtrooms. Moreover, these innova-
tions pose issues concerning their admissibility, evidentiary value, and
potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, as well as the extent to which their
underlying components are subject to disclosure and discovery 51 Finally,
these futuristic technologies exacerbate existing inequalities in the judicial
system. Parties with the resources to hire attorneys and to take full advantage
of the judicial process are also more likely to be able to afford often
extremely expensive computer and video technologies. Litigants without such
resources, defendants who appear before courts pro se or with the assistance
49. Robert F Seltzer & Mark G. Phillips, Laser Discs Propel Courts into the Future, MASS. LAW.
WEEKLY, Nov. 11, 1991, at SI; Parloff, supra note 44, at 4.
50. Panel Three, supra note 39, at 1082 (statement of Theodore D. Ciccone).
51. Hansen, supra note 45; Alan Aldous, Note, Disclosure of Expert Computer Simulations, 8
COMPUTER/LAW J. 51 (1987); Elaine M. Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used
at Trial and the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REv. 735 (1986); Craig Murphy, Comment,
Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 145 (1990); Lory D. Wharton, Comment, Litigators Byte the Apple: Utilizing Computer-
Generated Evidence at Trial, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 731 (1989).
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of pro bono or court-appointed counsel, perhaps even the government itself,
are unlikely to have equal access to these powerful tools.
More significantly, while computers and video may better hold jurors'
attention or even increase their retention, technology alone will not bridge the
widespread communications gaps between jurors and other participants in the
trial process. Rather, the answer lies in a clearer understanding of the jury's
role in the judicial system and the type of information and understanding that
is necessary if the jury is to fulfill that role.
III. THE ROLE OF THE JURY
Juries fill a variety of roles in modern society According to the United
States Supreme Court, the jury's functions include protecting citizens against
"arbitrary law enforcement,"52 "the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor,"53
and "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."54 The Court has written that
juries "interpos[e] between the accused and his accuser the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen 125 One of the normative functions of
trials is to symbolically "reinforce aspects of prevailing ideology," writes law
professor Alexander Tanford.56 "The prominence of the jury is often said to
symbolize democratic ideals. Trials also serve to reinforce social and
moral norms concerning appropriate behavior and to define the boundaries of
acceptable conduct."57
Juries also play an important role in preserving social order. Professor
Tanford writes that some trials, especially criminal trials, also:
provide an apparently neutral way to legitimate the state's exercise of
power over its citizens and its claim of a monopoly over physical violence.
To serve these functions, trials must appear to be a viable method for
resolving conflicts so that citizens will bring their disputes to the legal
system rather than settle them in the streets. 5s
None of these roles involves discerning the truth and, in fact, objective truth
may not be a goal of the judicial system. Despite the Supreme Court's
52. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
54. Id.
55. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; see Elizabeth F. Loflus & Edith Greene, Twelve Angry People: The
Collective Mind of the Jury, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1433 (1984) (reviewing REID HAsTiE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983)).
56. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L. 137, 164 (1990).
57. Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 165.
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rhetoric on the importance of juries in determining truth,59 courts look to
juries for "legally accurate verdicts" rather than factually accurate ones.6"
Determining the guilt or innocence of the accused is the practical task that
juries across the country perform every day, but the simple fact is that we do
not rely on juries because they are most accurate or most efficient at this task.
In fact, accuracy and efficiency are plainly not the highest priorities of the
judicial system, because a host of legal rules run directly contrary to those
goals.6'
Juries are neither neutral decision makers, nor blank slates that will make
rational decisions based only on what they hear or see in court. On the
contrary,
jurors come to their task with a wide range of accurate and inaccurate
perceptions about trials and conflicts between parties, which can influence
how they assess evidence and make their decisions. In other contexts, the
legal system recognizes, and in fact values, the personal experiences and
common knowledge that the jurors bring to their task.62
It is because they are supposed to represent the interests and the breadth of
their communities' moral sense that juries, rather than a judge or one or two
individual jurors, are used.
If the jury is to perform the many functions assigned to it-to safeguard
liberty, to protect against the government, to represent the community, to
preserve social order, and to determine guilt or innocence-the jury must be
composed of informed citizens who are representative of the community and
it must play an informed role in the trial process. As Jay B. Stephens, the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, stated at the first
Annenberg jury forum:
[F]rom the perspective of the government, it is generally to our
advantage to have intelligent jurors who listen to the evidence, who
59. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (noting that trials are a "truth-determining
process"); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (stating that the law is to "advance 'the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials"') (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970)); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) ("[A]mving at the truth is a fundamental
goal of our legal system.") (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975)); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("'[T]he normally predominant principle [is that] of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining truth."') (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
60. Tanford, supra note 56, at 163.
61. For example, the law requires a presumption of innocence or that guilt in criminal matters be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Or, as Professor Tanford writes, the trial system "in fact encourages
lawyers to conceal and suppress damaging information, to exaggerate the significance of favorable
evidence, and to try to deceive the jury about the importance of facts or the way the law works." Id.
at 160 (citation omitted).
62. Shar S. Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
251-52.
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evaluate the evidence, and who do not go off on extraneous kinds of issues.
That purpose is served, I think, by informed jurors, by jurors who are an
integral part of the community, who participate in the community, who are
aware of what is going on in the community and who stay informed.63
This understanding of the jury-an informed, engaged participant in the trial
process, not merely a blank slate-is the basic guarantee of fairness given to
every criminal defendant. Because the informed, active jury plays such an
important constitutional role in the United States judicial system, this
understanding argues forcefully for addressing those communications gaps that
presently distance many juries from the very cases they are supposed to
decide. And, as we have argued elsewhere,' it is the reason why potential
jurors should not be excluded from jury service just because they have been
exposed to information about the people or events involved in a trial.
While the very techniques that courts employ to remedy the problems
created by media saturation outside the courtroom may skew the jury's
representativeness and interaction-the diversity and breadth of experiences
and views that are the defendant's fundamental guarantee of faimrness-so too
do poor communications between the jury and other trial participants.
CONCLUSION
In the case of communications failures outside the courtroom-particularly
escalating media coverage of people and events that subsequently become
embroiled in trials-the all too frequent search for jurors wholly unacquainted
with the facts of a notorious case is a waste of the judicial system's time and
money. Moreover, it threatens the diversity of views and experiences that
jurors bring to the jury box, the very foundation of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of an impartial jury.
Communications failures within the modern courtroom, however, raise
equally important constitutional issues. Pervasive communications gaps that
render jurors "bored and confused" and lead them to "misunderstand[] key
legal concepts" 65 protect neither the defendant's constitutional rights nor the
public's legitimate interest in justice. Whether the judge or attorneys fail to
communicate effectively with the jury, or whether there is prejudicial, even
if madvertant, nonverbal communication, the issue is not simply that the jury
may be diverted from reaching the "right" decision. The more fundamental
concern is that the informed interaction among the individual members of the
63. Current Judicial Practice, supra note 37, at 581 (statement of Jay B. Stephens).
64. Minow & Cate, supra note 13.
65. Marcotte, supra note 16, at 32.
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jury and between the jury and other trial participants is frustrated. As
Professor Forston wrote almost two decades ago:
It is self-evident that if the communications process is not effective-if
jurors are unsure about the.evidence, unclear on the meaning of the law,
confused by legal jargon, bewildered by trial procedure, or uncertain of the
role they are to play-the jury cannot be expected to perform its function
intelligently.6
The century-old failure of the judicial system to remedy the communications
chasm between the jury and the judge and attorneys is as damaging to the
jury's ability to do justice as the failure to seat a diverse, representative jury
in the first place.
Important initiatives to bridge those gaps are being tried in many court-
rooms: better juror orientation; more frequent direct communication between
the judge and the jury and between attorneys and the jury; asking the jurors
if they have any questions about the evidence, the trial process, or their role;
giving jury instructions both before and after the evidence is presented;
allowing jurors to take notes and to have copies of testimony, instructions,
and key documentary evidence; simplifying and clarifying instructions;
permitting jurors to question witnesses; allowing jurors to talk to each other
about the case; and responding meaningfully to questions submitted by the
jury during deliberations. Each of these initiatives offers the opportunity for
real improvement in jury communication and understanding.
New technologies offer hope as well. Computers and interactive video, by
appealing to jurors visually, can stimulate their interest, improve their
understanding, and increase their ability to retain and recall evidence that has
been presented during trial. Complex facts and points of law can be explained
more clearly and effectively And burdensome exhibits, transcripts, and other
documents can be managed efficiently These technological innovations, while
raising their own important issues, bode well for increasing the clarity of
courtroom communications.
But the meaningful experimentation with, and effective deployment of, these
innovations depends on the frank recognition of the constitutional importance
of an informed, comprehending jury The communications failures that plague
the modern courtroom must be solved not as a favor to future generations of
jurors, but because to do less undermines defendants' Sixth Amendment rights
and the capacity of courts to do justice.
66. Forston, supra note 17, at 606.
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